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INTRODUCTION 
When Electronic Arts Inc. (Electronic Arts) launched its video game 
series NCAA Football in June 1993, the available technology limited 
developers to crafting avatars that looked like faceless figurines.1 
Today, however, advancements in digital technology have enabled 
developers to create “virtual players” that strongly resemble their real-
life counterparts.2 For example, in NCAA Football 12, the avatar that 
represents University of Florida running back Chris Rainey possesses 
Chris Rainey’s actual height, weight, skin complexion, and hair style.3 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Joe Fortenbaugh, Inside NCAA Football 12, NAT’L FOOTBALL POST (July 11, 
2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/Inside-NCAA-Football-12.html (explaining 
that Electronic Arts’s NCAA Football video games have “come a long way since the 
days. . . . when an open-field tackle looked like one bowling pin knocking down another 
bowling pin”). 
 2. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761, 764 (D.N.J. 2011) (discussing 
the realistic appearances of Electronic Arts’s virtual players); see also Katie Thomas, College 
Stars See Themselves in Video Games, and Pause to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2009, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/04/sports/04ncaa.html (same); Sean Hanlon & 
Ray Yasser, “J.J. Morrison” and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 241, 247, 271 (2008) (describing the high quality graphics in Electronic 
Arts’s video games).  
 3. Compare Antonya English, UF Streak? What UF Streak?, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Sept. 
20, 2011, at 2C, available at http://www.tampabay.com/sports/colleges/article1192460.ece 
(showing Florida running back Chris Rainey wearing a clear visor, sweatbands on his elbows, a 
towel on his waist, and gloves), with The Photographic Side of NCAA Football 12, OPERATION 
SPORTS (Sept. 26, 2011, 8:53 PM), http://www.operationsports.com/forums/ncaa-football/ 
492578-photographic-side-ncaa-football-12-a-190.html (providing a photograph of the 
Electronic Arts video game version of Chris Rainey, containing each of these same attributes).  
2
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In addition, both Chris Rainey and his virtual counterpart wear the same 
jersey number, visor, gloves, and sweatbands.4  
Recently, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Taylor Branch criticized 
video game publishers for failing to pay for the use of college athletes’ 
likenesses.5 According to Branch, failing to pay for college athletes’ 
likenesses not only leads to windfall profits for video game publishers, 
but also transforms college athletes into a “profit center” for their 
business partner, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).6  
At the core of intellectual property law, there lies a well-established 
principle that “if you create something, then that something is . . . yours 
to exploit.”7 Based upon this principle, courts have generally disallowed 
the unlicensed, commercial use of celebrity likenesses.8 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 5. See, e.g., Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 
4, available at  http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-
sports/308643/1/ (describing the “shame of college sports” and pointing out that while millions 
of dollars are “ultimately derive[d] from the college athletes whose likenesses are shown in the 
films or video games. . . . none of the profits go to them”) (emphasis added). 
 6. Id.; see also CLC Grants EA Exclusive College Football Video Game License, 
BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 11, 2005, 8:30 AM) http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/200504110 
05378/en/CLC-Grants-EA-Exclusive-College-Football-Videogame (announcing that the 
Collegiate Licensing Company, which is the marketing arm for the NCAA, had signed a six-
year, exclusive deal to license NCAA intellectual property from video games to Electronic 
Arts). See generally Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (noting that Electronic Arts pays a licensing 
fee for the “use of team trademarks, uniforms, and logos[] that are included in the NCAA 
Football video game”); Beth A. Cianfrone & Thomas A. Baker III, The Use of Student-Athlete 
Likenesses in Sport Video Games: An Application of the Right of Publicity, 20 J. LEGAL ASPECTS 
SPORTS 35, 37 (2010) (“[F]or the 2005–06 season, the University of Florida and Ohio State 
University each earned $130,500 in licensed royalties from EA. The games have proven to be an 
added revenue source, in addition to being a strong promotional tool, for the NCAA and its 
member institutions.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 7. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET. AL., PROPERTY 51 (6th ed. 2006); accord Uhlaender v. 
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (“Perhaps the basic and underlying 
theory is that a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his own industry free from unjustified 
interference.”); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (noting that “[i]f 
there is value in [one’s likeness] sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the 
property of him who gives it the value and from whom the value springs?”); Melville B. 
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954) (recognizing that 
from this principle of acquisition of creation comes “the right of each person to control and 
profit from the publicity values which he has created or purchased”). But see generally Michael 
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. 
L. REV. 125, 173–96 (1993) (arguing that this principle is misguided on a number of grounds in 
the context of protecting one’s likeness). 
 8. See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that in 
California, the common law elements of a right of publicity claim include “(1) the defendant’s 
use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s 
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury”); White v. 
Samsung Elecs. of Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2007) (defining in 
3
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courts have failed to protect the publicity rights of Division I college 
athletes.9 Instead, they have created a First Amendment loophole to 
circumvent college athletes’ rights.10  
This Article argues that despite First Amendment concerns, courts 
should protect college athletes’ publicity rights in commercial video 
games. Part I of this Article discusses the status of the American college 
athlete and the practice of licensing intellectual property rights from 
colleges to video game publishers. Part II introduces the state-law right 
of publicity—an intellectual property right that protects commercial 
interests in one’s own likeness. Part III explains why Electronic Arts’s 
video games violate the publicity rights of college football players. Part 
IV explains why courts should not allow video game publishers to hide 
behind a First Amendment defense when publishers are using exact 
depictions of college football players’ likenesses. Finally, Part V 
concludes that even if a video game publisher were to create an avatar 
that partially transforms a college athlete’s likeness, the courts should 
still recognize some liability in the video game publisher for the use of 
the nontransformed aspects of the college athlete’s identity. 
I.  THE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETE AND THE 
PRACTICE OF LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM 
COLLEGES TO VIDEO GAME PUBLISHERS 
A.  The Status of the American College Athlete 
College athletes represent a unique class of celebrity within 
American society.11 On the one hand, college athletes are revered for 
                                                                                                                     
Missouri the elements of a right of publicity action as including “(1) [t]hat defendant used 
plaintiff’s name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to obtain 
a commercial advantage”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Uhlaender, 316 F.Supp. at 
1279 (D. Minn. 1970) (treating a breach of the right of publicity as constituting “appropriation 
for commercial benefit of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”). 
 9. See, e.g., Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (rejecting a college athlete’s right of publicity 
claim in the context of a commercial video game); cf. O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 
169–70 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that a college football player could not make a claim for breach 
of his right of privacy for the use of his picture in a beer advertisement where the beer 
manufacturer had purchased rights to the picture directly from the athlete’s college). 
 10. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84 (noting that even though video game publishers 
“walk a fine line . . . [of] exploiting the hard-earned reputations of college players for [their] 
own profit,” protecting a limited number of “creative elements” in Electronic Arts’s video game 
is more important than protecting collegiate athletes’ rights to control the use of their own 
identities); see also id. at 784 (noting that “there are sufficient elements of [one’s] own 
expression found in [Electronic Arts’s college-sports video games] that justify . . . First 
Amendment protection”).  
 11. See Dave Fairbank, Giving Back to 757, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, VA), July 12, 
2009, at C1 (“In an area without major-league sports, high school and college athletes are 
celebrities. If they make it to the pros, they provide living, breathing, neighborhood examples of 
success.”); Stephanie Pedersen, Stephanie Pedersen Commentary: Twitter Trash Talk Causing 
4
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their strength, agility, and skill.12 But on the other hand, college athletes 
are generally prohibited from earning money based on their athletic 
talents.13 This general prohibition arises from the NCAA’s Principle of 
Amateurism, which states that “student-athletes shall be amateurs in 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated 
primarily by education and by the physical, mental[,] and social benefits 
to be derived.”14 
Based upon this Principle of Amateurism, the NCAA requires its 
athletes to decline salaries for playing their sport, and to reject 
remuneration, in any form, offered in connection with their status as 
athletes.15 In addition, the NCAA deems college athletes ineligible to 
compete in sporting events if they “permit[] the use of [their] name or 
picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a 
commercial product or service of any kind.”16 
                                                                                                                     
Trouble for College Athletes, LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Columbus, GA), Aug. 13, 2011, available at 
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/2011/08/13/1692325/stephanie-pedersen-commentary.html (“Whether you 
like it or not, high school recruits and college athletes are celebrities.”). 
 12. See Erik Brady, Athletes’ Service Organization Gets $140,000 Grant, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 3, 1994, at C6 (quoting AmeriCorp CEO Eli Segal stating that “student-athletes are 
admired for their sport skills”); see also Andrew Bagnato, NCAA, Schools, Athletes Seek Money 
Answers—College Athletes Can Be Famous but Without the Money to Wash Clothes, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
archive/?date=19970316&slug=2529008 (providing examples of admiration and idolization of a 
college athlete within the local community). 
 13. See generally NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2011–12 NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL, § 2.9 (effective Aug. 1, 2011) (The Principle of Amateurism) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4224-2011-2012-ncaa-division-i-
manual.aspx (noting the amateur status of college athletes). This Principle of Amateurism 
originally emerged from nineteenth-century England, during which time young men of 
privileged economic status regularly engaged in unpaid athletic events at colleges such as 
Oxford and Cambridge. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, Major 
College Sports: A Modern Apartheid, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 13, 22 (2010); see also 
Daniel Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust 
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 331 n.7 (2007) (tracing America’s version of amateur college 
athletics back to the British model at universities such as Cambridge and Oxford); Kay Howes, 
Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved over Time, NCAA NEWS ARCHIVE, Jan. 3, 2000, available 
at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2000/association-wide/debate%2Bon%2Bamate 
urism%2Bhas%2Bevolved%2Bover%2Btime%2B-%2B1-3-00.html (same, from the perspective 
of the NCAA). It was then adopted by the NCAA upon its inception in 1906 as a way to protect 
its members from competing for the services of premier athletic labor, even though few 
American athletes were from privileged families. See id. (noting that when the NCAA first 
adopted its Principle of Amateurism in 1906, the association of member colleges was “known as 
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States”). 
 14. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, at § 2.9. 
 15. Id. at § 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). 
 16. See id. at § 12.5.2.1 (Advertisements and Promotions After Becoming a Student-
Athlete). 
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Nevertheless, the NCAA operates as a commercial entity.17 For 
example, the NCAA licenses its broadcast rights for sporting events to 
both public and cable television stations.18 Similarly, the NCAA 
licenses its trademark rights for use by corporate business partners.19 
Thus, the NCAA’s unique treatment of college athletes as amateurs 
within a broader commercial enterprise creates both confusion and 
uncertainty for the outside world.20  
B.  The Practice of Licensing Intellectual Property Rights from Colleges 
to Video Game Publishers 
Although the NCAA shamelessly licenses its intellectual property 
rights to video game publishers, the NCAA’s stringent enforcement of 
its Principle of Amateurism prevents publishers from negotiating 
directly with college athletes to acquire rights to use their likenesses.21 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New 
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 497 (2008) (noting 
that “[t]he idea that major college sports are amateur is demonstrably false, and that fallacy has 
improperly sheltered college sports from the application of a variety of laws”); see also Marc 
Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 861, 862 (2002) (noting that college athletic directors and coaches seek to limit college 
athletes’ economic opportunities because they, in turn, are able to maintain a greater share of 
their athletic departments’ proceeds, as well as to reap some of the endorsement deals that 
otherwise would go to college athletes); Darren A. Heitner & Jeffrey L. Levine, Corking the 
Cam Newton Loophole, a Sweeping Suggestion, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 341, 342 (2011) 
(“[W]hile the NCAA trumpets its philosophy of amateur competition, an increasing refrain 
points to the hypocritical nature of the Association, as its financial success is built on the sweat 
of amateur athletes.”); Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 354–55 (“[T]he assumption that so-called 
student-athletes in high profile Division I football and basketball programs are students first and 
athletes second may reflect more of an idealistic fantasy than modern reality. . . . [T]hey are 
inextricably intertwined with university activities that are irrefutably commercial.”); Branch, 
supra note 5, at 2 (“The NCAA makes money, and enables universities and corporations to 
make money, from the unpaid labor of young athletes.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ok., 468 
U.S. 85, 89–94 (1984) (discussing the history of the NCAA’s broadcasting plan of college 
football games on television); Marc Edelman & David Rosenthal, A Sobering Conflict: The Call 
for Consistency in the Message Colleges Send About Alcohol, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1389, 1404–05 (2010) (noting that the NCAA garners billions of dollars in 
revenues from selling sports broadcasting rights to television stations). 
 19. See generally NCAA.ORG, NCAA Licensing Program Frequently Asked Questions, 
https://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_relations/corprel/corporate+relationships/licensin
g/faqs.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
 20. Cf. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 497 (noting that “[t]he idea that 
major college sports are amateur is demonstrably false”). 
 21. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13 (noting that the NCAA Principle of Amateurism 
states that “student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation 
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be 
derived”). Because the NCAA Principle of Amateurism prohibits college athletes from 
“accept[ing] any remuneration” based on their status as athletes and from “promot[ing] directly 
6
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In the absence of a practical means to license the use of college athletes’ 
likenesses, publishers are left to consider how to make their games as 
realistic as possible without infringing upon rights they do not own. 
Without any perfect course of action, the company that currently 
enjoys an exclusive license to use NCAA logos in college football 
games, Electronic Arts, has adopted the strategy of producing video 
games that use college athletes’ virtual images and biographical data but 
not their actual names.22 This strategy, however, is somewhat troubling 
because Electronic Arts’s virtual players are still easily identifiable as 
their real-life counterparts based on their jersey numbers, positions, 
physical characteristics (height and weight), physical abilities, and 
biographical details.23 Furthermore, NCAA Football users are able to 
easily identify virtual players as their real-life counterparts based on a 
game feature that allows users to add surnames to the back of virtual 
players’ jerseys.24 Once a user adds surnames, the game announcer will 
then refer to each avatar by the designated surname.25 
Thus, even though Electronic Arts does not explicitly market a game 
that includes avatars that bear the names of college athletes, the ultimate 
result is, in essence, no different. It is on this basis that some college 
football players contend that Electronic Arts violates their publicity 
rights.26 
II.  THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A STATE-LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHT 
A.  Introduction to the Right of Publicity 
The “right of publicity” is a state-law intellectual property right that 
serves “to protect the commercial interest of celebrities and their 
identities.”27 In some states, the right of publicity arises entirely from 
                                                                                                                     
the sale or use of a commercial product,” video game publishers cannot easily enter into 
licensing agreements with college athletes. Id. at § 12.5.2.1.  
 22. See Appellee’s Brief at 5, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 10-15387 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 
2010). 
 23. See id.; Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761, 783 (D.N.J. 2011). 
 24. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 761; see also Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 
2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (noting that users of NCAA Football can add 
surnames to the avatars by use of third-party software that allows users to update avatar names 
for entire college football teams by downloading instantaneously the custom rosters of these 
teams). 
 25. See Cianfrone & Baker, supra note 6, at 43 (stating that if you manually insert a name 
for the avatars, the announcers will say that player’s name aloud during game play). 
 26. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 760–61 (explaining the grounds for the Hart lawsuit). 
 27. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983); see 
also Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (describing the right of 
publicity as “protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage 
such entertainment”); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The 
7
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statute.28 In others, it arises from common law principles set forth in an 
1890 law review article written by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis and attorney Samuel Warren.29 Meanwhile, in yet a third set of 
states, courts recognize both a statutory and common law right of 
publicity. 30 
In almost all states, a prima facie claim for violating one’s right of 
publicity requires the showing of four elements: (1) the use of one’s 
identity; (2) for purposes of a commercial advantage; (3) without 
consent; and (4) in a manner that causes monetary harm.31 If the 
plaintiff is able to make a prima facie showing of the breach of his 
publicity rights, the court will then balance the plaintiff’s right of 
publicity claim against potential affirmative defenses, including First 
Amendment defenses.32  
                                                                                                                     
right of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the 
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her [own] 
identity.”); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d  959, 967 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (“The right of publicity is the right of a person to control the commercial use of his or 
her identity. . . . While the right was originally intertwined with the right of privacy, courts soon 
came to recognize a distinction between the personal right to be left alone and the business right 
to control use of one’s identity in commerce.”) (citation omitted); Gionfriddo v. MLB, 114 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 307, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The right to exploit commercially one’s celebrity is 
primarily an economic right.”) (citations omitted). But cf. Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d. Cir. 1953) (“[A] man has a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph. . . . Whether it be labeled a ‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as often 
elsewhere, the tag ‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has 
pecuniary worth.”). 
 28. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (1984) (“Any person who knowingly uses 
another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, 
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, 
products, merchandise, goods, or services, without such person’s prior consent, or, in the case of 
a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages 
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1449(A) 
(1986) (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising 
or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without such 
person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons 
injured as a result thereof, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the 
use shall be taken into account in computing the actual damages.”). 
 29. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (crediting Brandeis and Warren’s article, The Right 
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), with laying the foundation for New Jersey’s 
recognition of the individual’s right to prevent the unauthorized commercial appropriation of his 
or her likeness). 
 30. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (noting a right of publicity claim filed under both California’s statutory and common law 
right of publicity).  
 31. See cases cited supra note 8. 
 32. See Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313 (“[T]he common law right does not provide 
relief for every publication of a person’s name or likeness. The First Amendment requires that 
the right to be protected from unauthorized publicity [and] be balanced against the public 
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B.  Elements of a Claim for Breach of the Right of Publicity 
1.  Use of One’s Identity 
The exact scope of circumstances that will satisfy the first element of 
any right of publicity claim, “use of one’s identity,” is unclear, but may 
at the least be satisfied by the use of someone else’s actual name or 
likeness.33 In addition, most courts deem the “use of one’s identity” to 
include any drawing, sculpture, or design that is intended to represent a 
particular individual—irrespective of whether that person is mentioned 
by name.34 For instance, in Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held that a composite drawing of 
a naked African-American man in a boxing ring that contained many of 
the facial features of boxer Muhammad Ali had used the former 
heavyweight champion’s identity.35 Similarly, in Young v. Greneker 
Studios, Inc., the New York Supreme Court held that a mannequin that 
was modeled after the plaintiff had used her identity.36 
In this same vein, most courts have found the “use of one’s identity” 
to extend to the impersonation of one’s likeness either electronically or 
through other forms of new media.37 For example, in White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that Samsung Electronics America misappropriated the identity of 
Wheel of Fortune hostess Vanna White by airing a television 
commercial that depicted a female-shaped robot wearing a long gown, 
blonde wig, and large jewelry while turning block letters on a game 
                                                                                                                     
interest in the dissemination of news and information consistent with the democratic processes 
under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and of the press.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). But cf. Transcript of Proceedings to Consolidate Various 
Litigations Against the NCAA at 34, Keller v. Elec. Arts, No. C-09-1967 CW, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
1, 2010) (referencing discussion of the First Amendment as an “affirmative defense” to a claim 
of breach of one’s right of publicity) (quoting Robert B. Carey, lawyer for Samuel Keller). 
 33. See White v. Samsung Elecs. of Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding the use of one’s name or likenesses to suffice the most narrowly construed contours of 
using the plaintiff’s identity); see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding the use of one’s name, even 
without their likeness, is generally sufficient); cf. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
607, 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (defining “likeness” as “a person’s visual image”). 
 34. Cf. Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that Mars 
Incorporated did not violate The Naked Cowboy’s right of publicity by producing an animated 
cartoon featuring a blue M&M dressed up exactly like The Naked Cowboy in white underwear, 
a white cowboy hat, white cowboy boots and a white guitar). 
 35. 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 36. 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (1941) (analyzing the use of a look-alike mannequin of an 
otherwise non-famous individual under the right of privacy, rather than the right of publicity). 
 37. See generally White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. 
L. REV. 383, 401–07 (1960)). 
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board.38 Meanwhile, in Wendt v. Host International, Inc., the same court 
determined that the use of animatronic robots resembling actors from 
the television show Cheers was subject to factual analysis under the 
right of publicity.39 
Most recently, some courts have even extended the definition of 
“identity” to include electronic images and video game avatars. 
Notably, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the Court of Appeals of 
California held that performer Kieran Kirby had presented a triable 
issue of fact about the misuse of her likeness where Sega of America, 
Inc. sold a video game that featured a character who shared Kirby’s thin 
figure, facial features, and form-fitting clothing.40 Likewise, in No 
Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., the Court of Appeals of California 
found that a video game publisher that allowed users to manipulate 
avatars resembling members of the band No Doubt had impermissibly 
used the band members’ likenesses.41  
2.  Commercial Advantage 
The second element of a breach of publicity rights claim, 
“commercial advantage,” includes the use of goodwill of another’s 
name or identity for purposes of making a profit.42 “Profit alone,” 
however, does not necessarily “render expression ‘commercial.’”43 For 
instance, though the use of one’s name or identity for purposes of 
writing a biography does not violate this prong of the analysis, “the use 
of that same data . . . in connection with a [moneymaking] project” 
poses a likely violation.44 
The most traditional category of “commercial advantage” involves 
the use of an individual’s name or likeness for advertising and 
                                                                                                                     
 38. White, 971 F.2d at 1399. 
 39. Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d. 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “it cannot 
be said as a matter of law that [Universal’s animatronic robot] figures are so dissimilar from 
[Cheers actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger] that no reasonable trier of fact could find 
them to be ‘likenesses’”). 
 40. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 613–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 41. 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  
 42. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d. Cir. 
1953); see also Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970) (“A name is 
commercially valuable as an endorsement of a product or for financial gain . . . .”). 
 43. Gionfriddo v. MLB, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 44. See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 461–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1967); see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(“[P]laintiff must prove that defendant intended to obtain a commercial advantage, and it is not 
enough to show that defendant incidentally obtained a commercial advantage by using 
plaintiff’s name or that defendant had some other purpose in using plaintiff’s name other than to 
obtain a commercial advantage.”) (citing Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 
1997)). 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss2/5
2013] PROTECTING COLLEGE ATHLETES’ PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN COMMERCIAL VIDEO GAMES 563 
 
merchandising purposes, or as a means of indicating an endorsement.45 
Meanwhile, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition additionally 
recognizes the use of a name or likeness as being for a commercial 
advantage “in connection with services rendered by the user,” even 
absent an advertisement or endorsement.46 Under this view, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held in C.B.C. 
Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P. that the use of “baseball players’ identities in . . . fantasy 
baseball products” is sufficient to meet the “commercial advantage” 
requirement of the right of publicity.47 Likewise, the Superior Court of 
New Jersey, Chancery Division, held in Arnold Palmer v. Schonhorn 
Enterprises, Inc. that the use of professional golfers’ identities in 
conjunction with a paperboard box game represented an impermissible 
“commercial project.”48 
3.  Without Consent 
The third element of analysis, “without consent,” is met whenever a 
party uses another’s identity without the rights-holder’s permission.49 A 
plaintiff seeking to state a claim rarely has much difficulty satisfying 
this element.50 However, a plaintiff may fail to meet the “without 
consent” element if he previously licensed the right to use his likeness 
to the defendant, or if he had previously licensed the right to use his 
likeness to a third party that later sublicenses the right to the 
defendant.51  
                                                                                                                     
 45. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 
F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995); see also C.B.C. Distrib. 
& Mktg., 505 F.3d at 822. 
 47. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 823. For a more general discussion of the right of 
publicity in fantasy sports games, see also Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports 
and the Law: How America Regulates Its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
1, 42–44 (2012). 
 48. Palmer, 232 A.2d at 462. 
 49. See generally C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg, Inc., 505 F.3d at 822 (discussing element 
of consent); Jones v. Corbis Corp., 815 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113–16 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 50. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 822 (noting that all parties in the case agree 
that the use of baseball players’ names and playing information occurred, at some point, without 
the players’ consent); see also Palmer, 232 A.2d at 459 (noting the same with respect to the use 
of the names of golfers and members of the Professional Golfers’ Association of America in a 
golf table game). 
 51. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (explaining that a valid license to use one’s likeness negates the argument of lack of 
consent). 
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4.  Monetary Harm 
Finally, a claim for breach of one’s publicity rights requires a 
plaintiff to show monetary harm.52 Thus, in stark contrast with the right 
of privacy’s requirement of showing damages to one’s feelings, the 
right of publicity requires the showing of an actual financial impact.53 
The traditional measure of damages for the breach of one’s right of 
publicity “focuses on [either] the pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or the 
unjust pecuniary gain to the defendant.”54 Typically, either calculation 
would lead a court to the same result—awarding a payment in the 
amount of the fair market value of the use of one’s likeness for the 
particular purpose.55 
C.  The First Amendment Defense 
If a plaintiff is able to meet its prima facie burden, the court will next 
consider potential affirmative defenses.56 Among these affirmative 
defenses, the ones most frequently invoked involve the First 
Amendment.57 As a general matter, “[t]he First Amendment only 
protects speech from regulation by the government.”58 However, 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 
894, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (referring to the “monetary harm” prong as “resulting injury”; Doe v. 
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003)  (discussing monetary nature of the right of 
publicity); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (1995) (explaining 
calculation of damages under a breach of publicity rights claim). 
 53. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d. Cir. 
1953) (discussing the notion of a right of privacy and comparing it with the right of publicity); 
see also TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 368 (noting that the right of publicity focuses on 
monetary harm). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 49 cmt. b (1995). 
 55. See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 368 (referring to the plaintiff’s attempt to 
calculate damages for alleged misappropriation of his right of publicity based on “the amount of 
the fair market value that respondents should have paid to use his name . . . and for damage done 
to the commercial value—in effect the endorsement value—of his name”). 
 56. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 767–68 (D.N.J. 2011). Many 
affirmative defenses are limited to individual states and largely conflate with First Amendment 
defenses; thus, they are beyond the scope of this Article. For example, California Civil Code 
§ 3334(d) provides a “public affairs exemption” from liability for any “use of a name . . . or 
likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any 
political campaign.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2010); see also Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 
No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), at *7 (discussing the 
California public affairs exception). 
 57. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 768; see also Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellee by Screen Actors Guild, Inc., et al. at 3, Keller v. Elec. Arts, No. 10-15387 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 8, 2010) (“For over a century, courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have 
carefully balanced [the right of publicity] with the protections accorded speakers under the First 
Amendment.”). 
 58. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
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because the right of publicity is a state-generated right that restricts free 
speech, courts must “directly balance the magnitude of the speech 
restriction against the asserted governmental interest in protecting the 
intellectual property right.”59 
This direct balancing is not an easy task.60 According to one leading 
treatise on the issue: 
In some cases of media use of human identity, there is 
indeed a conflict with the First Amendment. It is real. It 
will not go away. . . . There is no neatly packaged general 
rule that can be waved like a magic wand to make the 
solution any easier. The balance must be laboriously 
hacked out case by case.61 
Nevertheless, even despite a lack of clear “judicial consensus . . . on 
the contours of the First Amendment vis-à-vis the right of publicity,” 
three factors substantially shape the outcome of any court’s balancing 
analysis.62 First, courts generally grant broader First Amendment 
protection to speech that informs the public about matters of “public 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 972; see also Order on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts’s 
Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike at 7, Keller v. Elec. Arts, C-09-1967 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) 
(“The defense poses what is essentially a balancing test between the First Amendment and the 
right of publicity.”) (internal citations omitted); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court has directed 
that state law rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment considerations.”); 
Gionfriddo v. MLB, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Cal. App. Ct. 2001) (noting that “[t]he First 
Amendment requires that the right to be protected from unauthorized publicity be balanced 
against the public interest in the dissemination of news and information”) (internal quotations 
omitted) (emphasis added); cf. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (noting that courts throughout the 
country have adopted “up to eight ‘balancing’ tests that attempt to weight the First Amendment 
rights . . . against the right of publicity”). 
 60. See generally TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 372 (“Of course, not all speech is 
protected under the First Amendment . . . [C]ourts often will weigh the state’s interest in 
protecting a plaintiff’s property right to the commercial value of his or her name and identity 
against the defendant’s right to free speech.”). 
 61. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8.39, at 173 (2012). 
 62. Marshall Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALB.  L. 
REV. 1357, 1364 (2007); see also Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 972 (referencing such a balancing 
test); cf. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee by Screen Actors Guild, supra note 57, at 
5 (“For over a century, courts have wrestled with the interplay between [the right of publicity] 
and the First Amendment. As media evolved, the courts resolved the consequential intrusions on 
individual rights by striking a careful balance between competing interests.”). 
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interest.”63 This includes speech that is newsworthy, political, 
informative, or critical.64 
Next, courts award broader protection to speech that “contains 
significant transformative elements,” which extend beyond the mere 
literal depiction of a celebrity.65 In other words, courts are more likely 
to protect speech that is the synthesis of a variety of sources than speech 
that “is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”66 
                                                                                                                     
 63. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the public 
interest defense); see also Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 967; Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 774 (taking 
a broad view of public interest in concluding that “New Jersey recognizes a robust . . . defense” 
against right of publicity claims where “speech is newsworthy and informative”). 
 64. See Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 969–70 (noting that a set of parody baseball cards that 
provided social commentary on Major League Baseball players were awarded full First 
Amendment protection because the cards were more than just commercial speech); see also 
CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 259 F.R.D. 398, 414 (D. Minn. 
2009) (finding athletes’ statistical information to be in the public interest, at least where it was 
already in the “public domain”); Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 315 (noting that athletes’ 
statistical information fell within this category because such statistical information was 
informative). See generally Hilton, 599 F.3d at 912 (discussing California’s interpretation of its 
“public interest” defense extending to most matters of news reporting). By contrast, speech that 
does not inform includes speech that is intended primarily to attract money from third parties. 
See, e.g., Gridiron.com, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 
1315 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (noting that the use of college football players’ likenesses for purposes of 
attracting third party advertisements “go[es] way beyond merely conveying the news”). 
 65. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 935 (6th Cir. 2003); Kirby v. Sega of 
Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 615 (Cal. 2006) (“The transformative test is straightforward: 
[t]he inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the raw materials from which an original 
work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question.”) (internal quotations omitted); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. 
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (“[W]hen a work contains significant 
transformative elements . . . it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected 
by the right of publicity.”). 
 66. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 809; see also Hilton, 599 F.3d at 910 (“[I]t is clear 
that merely merchandising a celebrity’s image without that person’s consent . . . does not 
amount to a transformative use.”). With respect to this presumption, courts disagree about the 
proper role of a transformative element within the scope of the overall balancing test. See infra 
notes 128–38 and accompanying text; see also Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, 
Integrating the Right of Publicity with First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 166 (2010) (noting the great variations in “fundamental questions 
concerning the relationship of publicity rights to federal law”). On one end of the spectrum, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has implied that even a single transformative 
element might entitle the work to First Amendment protection. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936 
(concluding that defendant’s lithographs depicting Tiger Woods golfing at the 1997 Masters 
Tournament were protected by the First Amendment primarily because the lithographs also 
included the images of past Masters Tournament champions in the backdrop). By contrast, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri has held that even the full “transformation or fictionalized 
characterization of a person’s celebrity status” is not enough to defeat a claim for breach of the 
right of publicity if the defendant’s “sole purpose is the commercial use of that person’s name 
and identity.” Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (concluding 
that a test based solely on the presence of a transformative element involves “no balancing at 
14
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Finally, courts are most inclined to protect speech that does not 
thwart innovation.67 To illustrate this point, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit held in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc. that a 
publisher’s First Amendment right to sell a painting that contained 
Tiger Woods’s likeness trumped the golfer’s right of publicity.68 The 
court reasoned that even if it did not protect Tiger Woods’s publicity 
rights, he would likely still “reap substantial financial rewards from 
authorized appearances and endorsements.”69 By contrast, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co. 
concluded that the First Amendment “do[es] not immunize the media 
when they [are] broadcast[ing] a performer’s entire act without his 
consent . . . because the broadcast of [an] entire performance . . . goes to 
the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”70  
III.  WHY ELECTRONIC ARTS’S VIDEO GAMES LIKELY VIOLATE COLLEGE 
ATHLETES’ RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
Applying this step-by-step analysis, it is nearly certain that 
Electronic Arts’s depiction of college athletes in its NCAA Football 
video games meet each of the four elements required to show a prima 
facie breach of college athletes’ publicity rights.71 
                                                                                                                     
all”). 
 67. See generally C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Other motives for creating a publicity right are the 
desire to provide incentives to encourage a person’s productive activities . . . .”); see also 
MCCARTHY, supra note 61, at § 2.6 (claiming that publicity rights are intended to protect the 
financial incentive for celebrities to engage in beneficial activities that are within the public’s 
eye); infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 68. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 938. 
 69. Id. Similarly, in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the First Amendment rights 
of a fantasy sports host site trumped Major League Baseball players’ publicity rights in their 
names and statistics, partially because “major league baseball players are rewarded, and 
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional large sums from 
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.” 505 F.3d at 824; see also Edelman, supra note 
47, at 42–44 (discussing more generally the balance of the right of publicity against the First 
Amendment in fantasy sports games). 
 70. 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977); Meanwhile, in Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, in upholding the rights of publicity of numerous golfers, 
noted that “plaintiffs derive [a] substantial portion of their respective earnings from professional 
golf and the marketability of their names as professional golfers.” 232 A.2d 458, 459 (1967). 
 71. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 794 (D.N.J. 2011) (acknowledging 
that college athletes had a right of publicity in their likenesses, but holding against their right of 
publicity claims based on First Amendment considerations). 
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A.  Electronic Arts’s Video Games Use College Athletes’ Identities 
With respect to the first element, use of one’s likeness, the images 
that Electronic Arts uses in its video games are widely understood to 
represent specific college athletes.72 For example, avatars not only 
resemble real-life players, but they also share the real-life players’ 
jersey numbers, heights, weights, handednesses, and hometowns.73 In 
addition, Electronic Arts’s avatars include armbands, gloves, sleeves, 
and other “accessories” that match the items their real-life counterparts 
wear on game days.74 
Moreover, Electronic Arts does not stop at simply copying the visual 
likeness of college athletes.75 NCAA Football avatars also have specific 
ratings based on the athleticism and tendencies of the actual players 
they represent.76 For example, the avatar that serves in NCAA Football 
12 as the starting quarterback for the University of Michigan possesses 
one of the game’s highest possible speed ratings and a high rating for 
the likelihood of injury.77 These attributes are similar to those of 
University of Michigan’s real-life starting quarterback, Denard 
Robinson, who rushed for a school-record 2,570 yards in the 2010 
season and left ten of twelve games with an injury.78 
B.  Electronic Arts’s Video Games Use College Athletes’ Identities for a 
Commercial Advantage 
As for the second element, commercial advantage, the main purpose 
behind Electronic Arts’s use of college athletes’ likenesses is 
undoubtedly commercial.79 As a public company, Electronic Arts has a 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 822 (drawing similar conclusion with respect 
to use of players’ names in fantasy sports games). 
 73. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 786–87. 
 74. Id. at 761. 
 75. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (“Each virtual player [has] unique attributes, 
including personal characteristics (height, weight, athletic ability), accessories (helmet visor, 
wristband), physical abilities (speed and agility, throwing arm, passing accuracy) . . . .”). 
 77. See Sean Yuille, NCAA 12 Player Ratings for Big 10 Leak Out, SB NATION: DETROIT 
(June 30, 2011, 3:03 PM), http://detroit.sbnation.com/michigan-wolverines/2011/6/30/2252757/ 
ncaa-12-player-ratings-michigan-football-michigan-state (revealing that the game features 
Michigan quarterback Denard Robinson’s speed rating as 95 out of a possible 99); see also 
Reader Comment, Denard Robinson Injured Every Game, OPERATION SPORTS, 
http://www.operationsports.com/forums/ncaa-football/496928-denard-robinson-injured-every-
game.html (showing that his injury rating, out of a possible 99, is listed at 72). 
 78. See Nick Baumgardner, Denard Robinson Has Paid More Attention to His Health this 
Season, Feels Good at Midway Point of Season, ANN ARBOR.COM, (Oct. 12, 2011, 4:19 PM), 
http://annarbor.com/sports/um-football/denard-robinson-says-hes-paid-more-attention-to-his-he 
alth-this-season-feels-much-better. 
 79. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(discussing the importance of attempting to earn a profit in making a claim for breach of one’s 
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fiduciary duty to consider shareholder value.80 Even according to its 
annual report, the practice of using college athletes’ likenesses in sports 
video games relates to the goal of obtaining a positive impact on 
“revenues, profitability, and cash flow.”81 In other words, even though 
Electronic Arts could produce a functionally equivalent sports video 
game that does not use college athletes’ likenesses, Electronic Arts still 
prefers to use college athletes’ likenesses because consumers prefer 
video games with avatars that resemble actual college athletes.82 
Furthermore, unlike the depiction of celebrity likenesses in educational 
or politically themed video games, Electronic Arts’s use of college 
athletes in its NCAA Football video games does not serve any 
secondary, noncommercial purpose.83 For example, unlike the use of the 
likenesses of U.S. presidents in children’s video games, Electronic 
Arts’s use of celebrity likenesses is not designed to teach about 
important historic events.84 Moreover, unlike the depiction of the 
likenesses of conservative politicians and media personalities as villains 
in the politically themed video game Tea Party Zombies Must Die,85 
                                                                                                                     
publicity rights); see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, 505 F.3d 818, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Because we think that it is clear that CBC uses 
baseball players’ identities . . . for purposes of profit, we believe that their identities are being 
used for commercial advantage . . . .”) (emphasis added); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 
1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970) (same). 
 80. See, e.g., Lemon Bay Partners LLP v. Hammonds, 2007 WL 1830899, at *3, n.7 (D. 
Del. June 26, 2007) (noting that a public board of directors has “a duty to maximize shareholder 
value”). But see generally Shepard v. Meridian Ins. Grp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1113 (S.D. Ind. 
2001) (noting that the “business judgment rule was written to make clear, for example, that even 
in the sale of the business, the directors do not have an unqualified duty to maximize 
shareholder value at the expense of all other considerations and constituencies”). 
 81. Electronic Arts Inc., Annual Report, Form 10-K for the Period Ending Mar. 31, 2011, 
at 19. 
 82. See Brett Walton, Wii Sports is the Most Successful Videogame of All Time, VG 
CHARTZ (Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.vgchartz.com/article/2724/wii-sports-is-the-most-successful-
videogame-of-all-time (noting that Wii Sports “is the most purchased [video] game of all time” 
but does not use any athlete’s likeness in the game). 
 83. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 84. See President Games, Concentration 2, APPLES4THETEACHER.COM, available at 
http://www.apples4theteacher.com/holidays/presidents-day/games/concentration2. For an 
example of other video games that use famous likenesses in an educational manner, see History 
Detectives, Guess the Year, PBSKIDS.ORG, http://pbskids.org/historydetectives/games/capsule 
_index.html (using the likenesses of historical figures like Martin Luther King, Jr., Twiggy, and 
the Beatles in order to teach kids about the 1960s and 1970s). 
 85. In Tea Party Zombies Must Die, which used to be available at 
teapartyzombiesmustdie.com, video game manufacturer Jason Oda used the likenesses of 
conservative politicians and media personalities to portray a political message about Medicare, 
taxes, and a host of other issues. See Paige Lavender, ‘Tea Party Zombies Must Die’ Video 
Game Lets Players Kill Off Conservatives, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/07/tea-party-zombies-must-die-video-game_n_951896.html 
(noting that the video game Tea Party Zombies Must Die provides users with the opportunity “to 
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Electronic Arts’s use of college athletes’ likenesses in its college 
football video games does not convey a political message.  
C.  College Athletes Do Not Consent to the Use of Their Identities in 
These Video Games 
Similarly, with respect to the third element, lack of consent, there is 
little doubt that most college athletes do not consent to Electronic Arts’s 
use of their likenesses in video games.86 This is especially true in light 
of the NCAA Principle of Amateurism, which, if enforced, would take 
away college sports eligibility from any athlete that granted such 
consent.87 
A remote argument, appearing in the lawsuit O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
suggests that college athletes might implicitly consent to the use of their 
likenesses by signing the Student-Athlete Statement, which states that 
college athletes agree to abide by the NCAA Bylaws and to allow the 
NCAA’s subsequent licensing of their intellectual property rights in 
certain contexts.88 However, this argument is doubtful for at least four 
reasons.89 
First, the rights purportedly assigned by college athletes to the 
NCAA in the Student-Athlete Statement are limited to those rights 
implicated when “promot[ing] NCAA championships or other NCAA 
events, activities[,] or programs.”90 However, college sports video 
games serve primarily as an additional revenue source for the NCAA, 
                                                                                                                     
explore a post-apocalyptic Fox News studio and kill off zombies that resemble famous 
conservatives including Michele Bachmann, Sarah Palin, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Bill 
O’Reilly and Glenn Beck”); Joshua Rhett Miller, Video Game Targets ‘Tea Party Zombies,’ 
Fox News Personalities, FOX NEWS, Sept. 9, 2011, available at http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2011/09/07/video-game-targets-tea-party-zombies-fox-news-personalities (generally same); 
Glenn Garvin, New Video “Game” Goes Too Far, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12, 2011, available at 
2011 WLNR 18070001 (casting this video game in far harsher light); see also, e.g., Anti-Bush 
Game, SCUZZSTUFF.ORG, http://www.scuzzstuff.org/bushgame (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); 
Joshua Rhett Miller, Videogame Targets ‘Tea Party Zombies,’ Fox News Personalities, FOX 
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2011, at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/07/video-game-targets-tea-
party-zombies-fox-news-personalities (noting that the anti-Bush video game was similarly the 
creation of Jason Oda).  
 86. See generally NCAA MANUAL 2011–12 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 13, at 
§ 2.9, at 4 (Principle of Amateurism) (disallowing student-athletes from affirmatively selling use 
of their likenesses). 
 87. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, at § 2.9 (Principle of Amateurism); see also id. at 
§ 12.1.2 (Amateur Status). 
 88. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2010 WL 445190 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
8,, 2010); see also NCAA Form 08-3a, Academic Year 2008–09, at 4 (Part IV, Promotion of 
NCAA Championship Events, Activities or Programs). 
 89. See infra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. 
 90. See NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note 88, at 4. 
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and not as a way to “promote NCAA championships or other NCAA 
events, activities[,] or programs.”91  
Second, even to the extent that a court were to find the meaning of 
“promotion of NCAA championship events” to be ambiguous, an 
important maxim of contract law is that a court must interpret any 
ambiguities in contracts against the interests of the drafter.92 Therefore, 
recognizing that the Student-Athlete Statement was drafted by the 
NCAA, any uncertainty as to whether college sports video games fall 
within the set of categories that “promote NCAA championships” must, 
again, be interpreted in the negative.93 
Third, even presuming for the sake of argument that college athletes 
license their publicity rights to the NCAA via the Student-Athlete 
Statement, there is still no readily available evidence that the NCAA 
ever attempted to sublicense those rights to Electronic Arts. 
Finally, even presuming that the Student-Athlete Statement and 
some theoretical subsequent contract were deemed to grant Electronic 
Arts the right to use college athletes’ likenesses, a court still might find 
this arrangement void based on two grounds.94 First, a court might find 
the Student-Athlete Statement void due to lack of consideration with 
respect to non-scholarship college athletes, because the NCAA does not 
incur any legal detriment in exchange for the acquisition of college 
athletes’ publicity rights.95 Second, a court might deem such an 
arrangement void due to illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.96 The reason for this holding would be that any agreement among 
all of the NCAA member schools to require college athletes to sign such 
a statement is tantamount to an agreement to “fix the price 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See id. (quoting language assigning aspects of student-athletes’ rights of publicity to 
the NCAA and its member schools). 
 92. See, e.g., Sternberger v. United States, 401 F. 2d 1012, 1021 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1968); Sun 
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 807, 816 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1968); Jones v. 
United States, 304 F. Supp. 94, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 93. See NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note 88, at 4 (stating that by signing below, the student 
athlete “authorize[s] the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g. host 
institution, conference, local organizing committee)] to use [his or her] name or picture to 
generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”). 
 94. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 95. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 110 n.1 (1963) (defining consideration); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (“To constitute consideration, a performance or a return 
promise must be bargained for. . . . The performance may consist of (a) an act other than a 
promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal 
relation.”). See generally THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, 
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS at 132 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2004) (same); Edelman, supra 
note 47, at 27, n. 178 (same). 
 96. See Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2006)) (“Every . . . combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is 
declared to be illegal.”).  
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of . . . student athletes’ images at zero and to boycott former student 
athletes in the collegiate licensing market.”97 
D.  Electronic Arts’s Use of College Athletes’ Identities Causes 
Monetary Harm 
Lastly, the fourth element of any right of publicity claim, monetary 
harm, is also likely met.98 A court could easily calculate the monetary 
harm to college athletes by calculating the pecuniary gain derived from 
the use of their identities.99 For example, recognizing that Electronic 
Arts currently pays $35 million per year for the rights to use the names 
and likenesses of National Football League players in a similar video 
game, this amount could serve as a reasonable approximation of the 
monetary harm caused by Electronic Arts’s gain.100  
Of course, one potentially complicating factor in ascertaining the 
monetary harm for Electronic Arts’s use of college athletes’ likenesses 
is that by signing the National Letter of Intent and thereafter the 
Student-Athlete Statement, college athletes consent to forgo any 
pecuniary gains from the use of their likenesses during their college 
careers pursuant to the NCAA Principle of Amateurism.101 Thus, the 
actual pecuniary loss suffered by college athletes for the 
misappropriation of their likenesses may not perfectly align with the 
pecuniary gain enjoyed by Electronic Arts as the free-riding party. 102 
Nevertheless, the NCAA Principle of Amateurism is a private 
association’s mandate and not a rule of law.103 Thus, college athletes are 
entitled to compensation based on the unauthorized use of their 
                                                                                                                     
 97. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2010 WL 445190 at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). See generally Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from 
Illegal Group Boycotts?, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 639 (2009) (noting that group boycotts are 
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act both because they harm consumers and have the 
potential of preventing workers from “secur[ing] employment in [their] chosen avocation, trade 
and calling”). 
 98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 49, cmt. b (1995) (describing 
this monetary harm in term of either “pecuniary loss” or “pecuniary gain”). 
 99. See id. (explaining calculation of damages under a breach of publicity rights claim). 
 100. See NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, FORM LABOR ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT (2007); see 
also Daniel Kaplan, NFL Gives EA a Break, SPORTSBUSINESS (Feb. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/02/20110214/Leagues-and-Governing-
Bodies/NFL-EA.aspx (discussing the NFL and NFLPA licensing agreements with Electronic 
Arts). 
 101. Brief for Appellee at 7, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 10-15387 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 
2010) (citing NCAA MANUAL, § 12.5.1.1(h)). 
 102. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.  
 103. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, at §§ 2.9, 5.01 (Principle of Amateurism, General 
Principles) (stating that “[a]ll legislation of the Association that governs the conduct of 
intercollegiate athletics programs . . . shall be adopted by the membership in Convention 
assembled”). 
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likenesses, irrespective of the NCAA’s position on allowing college 
athletes to affirmatively sell the rights to use their identities.104 In 
addition, the use of college athletes’ likenesses in current video games 
may have a negative impact on college athletes’ ability to license their 
likenesses upon graduation for use in other video games.105 Thus, even 
if a court were inclined to enforce the NCAA Principle of Amateurism 
for the time period during which college athletes compete in their sport, 
doing so still should not bar college athletes from collecting on the 
misuse of their likenesses once they are no longer eligible for 
intercollegiate competition.106 
With this distinction in mind, any court that seeks to honor both 
college athletes’ publicity rights and the NCAA Principle of 
Amateurism could do so by simply ordering infringing video game 
publishers to pay damages into a trust fund.107 From this trust fund, a 
trustee could disburse each college athlete’s share as soon as the athlete 
is ineligible to participate in collegiate athletics.108 
IV.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT ELECTRONIC ARTS’S 
USE OF COLLEGE ATHLETES’ IDENTITIES 
Presuming that a reviewing court finds each of the four above 
elements met, a proper analysis of Electronic Arts’s liability next turns 
to assessing potential affirmative defenses, beginning with an analysis 
of the First Amendment defense.109 In balancing college athletes’ rights 
of publicity against Electronic Arts’s freedom of speech, a court must 
consider each of the three relevant factors referenced in Section II.C: 
                                                                                                                     
 104. See id. at §§ 12.1.2(a), 12.02.2 (defining “pay” as it applies to the disqualification of 
student-athletes). 
 105. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) 
(recognizing that unlicensed use of one’s likeness harms one’s ability to “reap [future] reward[s] 
of his endeavor[]”).  
 106. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, at §§ 2.9, 12.01.2 (noting this principle 
ceases to apply to individuals at the time they no longer serve as college athletes). 
 107. See Ben Cohen, The Case for Paying College Athletes: If the Rules Were More 
Flexible, Fewer Players Would Want to Break Them, THE WALL ST. J.: CLASSROOM EDITION, 
Nov. 2011, available at http://www.wsjclassroomedition.com/cre/articles/11nov_idea_college 
athletes.htm (noting that sports business author Marc Isenberg believes that there is a way 
without violating NCAA bylaws to “create a trust fund for athletes, funded by revenue from TV 
rights payments”). 
 108. See id. (stating that the trust could “be held in their name until they graduate”).  
 109. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (stating that  the First 
Amendment is an appropriate topic of inquiry because “video games communicate 
ideas . . . through [a] familiar literary device”); see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The protections afforded by the 
First Amendment, however, have never been limited to newspapers and books. The Supreme 
Court has relied on the First Amendment to strike down ordinances that ban the distribution of 
pamphlets . . . .”). 
21
Edelman: Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for Protecting Colle
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
574 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
(1) whether Electronic Arts’s speech is in the public interest; 
(2) whether the speech contains significant transformative elements; and 
(3) whether the speech provides a disincentive for college athletes to 
innovate in light of their current compensation structure.110 
A.  The “Public Interest” Defense 
As discussed in Section II.C, the “public interest” defense emanates 
from the notion that certain speech is so newsworthy, political, 
informative, or critical that it requires additional protection based on the 
intrinsic rights of the public interest.111 Thus, the heightened protection 
of public interest speech rests not only on the rights of the speaker, but 
also on “‘the right of the public to know and the freedom of the press to 
tell it.’”112 
Although the precise definition of “public interest speech” varies by 
court, it would be a far cry to treat the use of players’ likenesses in 
today’s sports video games as within the public interest.113 Reason 
being, even though the public enjoys Electronic Arts’s video games, 
these video games do not convey details about past events of 
importance, nor do they serve as an artistic vehicle to communicate a 
message, either supporting or criticizing collegiate sports.114 
To the contrary, Electronic Arts’s NCAA Football video games 
benefit only the “‘economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience.’”115 In this vein, college athletes’ likenesses appear in video 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See supra Section II.C. 
 111. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968–70 (noting that a set of parody baseball cards that 
provide social commentary on Major League Baseball players are awarded full First 
Amendment protection because the cards are more than just commercial speech); see also 
Gionfriddo v. MLB, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that athletes’ 
statistical information falls within this category because such statistical information is 
informative). 
 112. See Order on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts’s Anti-SLAPP 
Motion to Strike, supra note 59, at 10.    
 113. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 774 (D.N.J. 2011) (taking a 
broad view of “public interest” in concluding that New Jersey recognizes a “robust” defense 
against right of publicity claims where “speech is newsworthy and informative”). 
 114. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text; see also Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 
C-09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (noting that Electronic Arts’s 
video games do not “merely report or publish” information); see also Order on Defendants’ 
Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts’s Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike, supra note 59, at 12 
(noting that Electronic Arts’s video game series NCAA Football “is unlike the works in 
Gionfriddo [because NCAA Football] does not merely report or publish Plaintiff’s statistics and 
abilities. On the contrary, [Electronic Arts] enables the consumer to assume the identity of 
various student athletes and compete in simulated college football matches.”); id. at 12–13 
(contrasting the use of college athletes’ identities from video games from those involving 
fantasy sports games because a sports video game does not depend on updated reports of the 
real-life players’ progress and include depictions of athletes’ likenesses in avatar form). 
 115. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970  (quoting  Cent.  Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.  Serv. 
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games for the sole purpose of allowing the purchasers of these games 
“to replicate the experience of playing collegiate sports.”116 In other 
words, “[p]lacing present and former college athletes [into video games] 
strongly suggest[s] that the goal of the game is to capitalize upon the 
fame of those players.”117 Even Electronic Arts’s own Annual Report 
seems to indicate as much, noting that if Electronic Arts is unable to 
“acquire licenses to [college sports teams and players’] intellectual 
property . . . profitability and cash flows will decline.”118 
Indeed, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
recently reached the opposite conclusion in Hart v. Electronic Arts—
holding that the use of college athletes’ likenesses in Electronic Arts’s 
video games extends beyond the purely commercial, because “the 
speech is the video game that is being sold . . . [and] not a separate 
instance of speech that promotes the purchase of another work.”119 
Nevertheless, the court’s holding in Hart is questionable, as it seems to 
misapply existing case law on this point.120 Most notably, the court in 
Hart cited to a general rule that found “strong support” for finding 
speech to be commercial where: (1) the speech appears in an 
advertisement; (2) the speech refers to a specific product or service; and 
(3) the speaker has an economic motivation for his speech.121 However, 
the court incorrectly interpreted this general rule to mean that an 
absence of any one of these three elements always negates the 
possibility of finding particular speech to be commercial.122 Such a 
conclusion not only goes beyond the scope of the earlier case law, but it 
also misunderstands how to construct a contrapositive argument—one 
of the most basic rules of logical reasoning.123 
                                                                                                                     
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)); cf. Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316 (“The 
term ‘commercial speech’ has a special meaning in the context of the First Amendment. [T]he 
core notion of commercial speech is that it does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 116. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee by Screen Actors Guild, supra note 57, 
at 19.   
 117. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 783.  
 118. Electronic Arts Inc., Annual Report, Form 10-K for the Period Ending Mar. 31, 2011, 
at 17.  
 119. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 770–71.  
 120. See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
 121. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (citing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 
1017 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 122. Id. at 770–71. 
 123. See TOM BASSAREAR, MATHEMATICS FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS 30 (Marc 
Bove ed., 5th ed. 2012) (noting that “a statement and its contrapositive are logically 
equivalent”). A statement is said to be the contrapositive of another statement when its 
antecedent is negated by the consequent of the other and vice versa. See id. For example, the 
contrapositive of “[i]f it is a dog, then it has four legs and a tail” is “[i]f it doesn’t have four legs 
and a tail, then it is not a dog.” Id. 
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B.  There is No Transformative Element to Electronic Arts’s Speech 
In addition to balancing the public purpose of speech against the 
right of publicity, a court must also inquire as to whether there exists a 
“transformative element” that protects the speech.124 In the context of 
depicting digital images in video games, most courts have concluded 
that a transformative element is one that makes a celebrity’s likeness no 
longer the “sum and substance of the work in question,” but rather, “one 
of the raw materials from which an original work is synthesized.”125 In 
other words, “[i]f the product containing the celebrity’s likeness is so 
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression of what he or she is trying to create or portray . . . it is 
protected.”126 By contrast, “merely merchandising a celebrity’s image 
without that person’s consent . . . does not amount to a transformative 
use.” 127 
1.  Applying the Transformative Element Test in the Video Game 
Context 
Recently, several courts have considered whether using celebrity 
likenesses in video games is transformative. In the earliest of these 
cases, Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the Court of Appeals of California 
held that there were sufficient transformative elements to protect Sega’s 
incorporation of attributes from singer Kierin Kirby into the character 
Ulala—“a young, fictional, elongated, and extremely thin female 
reporter . . . who works for a news channel called Space Channel 5” in 
the twenty-fifth century.128 In deciding that case, the court concluded 
that Ulala was a “fanciful, creative character” and not simply a symbol 
of Kierin Kirby’s likeness.129 The court reached this conclusion for five 
separate reasons: (1) Ulala’s extremely tall, slender computer-generated 
physique was dissimilar from Kirby’s physique; (2) Ulala was based in 
part on the Japanese style of “anime”; (3) Ulala’s hairstyle and 
costumes differed from those worn by Kirby; (4) the dance moves 
performed by Ulala were different from those performed by Kirby; and 
(5) the Ulala character was not placed in modern time, but rather in a 
fanciful space-age setting from the twenty-fifth century.130 
Five years later, in No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., the Court 
of Appeals for California then held that video game publisher 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. 
 125. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
 126. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
 127. Hilton v. Hallmark, 599 F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 128. Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d  at 610, 615–16 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 129. Id. at 616, 618.  
 130. Id. at 616.  
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Activision used the band No Doubt’s likenesses in the video game Band 
Hero in a way that lacked sufficient transformative elements to award 
the video game First Amendment protection.131 There, the court 
reasoned that, unlike in Kirby, the “computer-generated recreations of 
the real band members” in No Doubt were “painstakingly designed to 
mimic their likenesses.”132 In other words, “Activision intentionally 
used these literal reproductions so that players could choose to ‘be’ the 
No Doubt rock stars.”133 
Most recently, the courts in Keller v. Electronic Arts and Hart v. 
Electronic Arts have attempted to apply the transformative element test 
specifically to college-sports video games.134 In Keller, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California held, upon motion to 
dismiss, that Electronic Arts’s depiction of a college football player in 
its NCAA Football video game “is not sufficiently transformative to bar 
his California right of publicity claims as a matter of law.”135 However, 
because the Keller opinion was addressing a motion to dismiss, the facts 
considered may have been skewed in favor of the plaintiff.136 
Meanwhile, in Hart v. Electronic Arts, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Jersey awarded summary judgment to Electronic Arts, 
finding that “there are sufficient elements of [Electronic Arts’s] own 
expression found in [the college football video game] that justify the 
conclusion that its use of [the plaintiff’s] image is transformative [and 
thus] entitled to First Amendment protection.”137 Nevertheless, much 
like how the court in Hart failed to properly apply the “public purpose” 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 615 (internal quotations omitted); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 397, 409–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 132. See No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 409–10. 
 133. See id. at 410. 
 134. See Order on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts’s Anti-SLAPP 
Motion to Strike, supra note 59, at 9; Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 771, 776  
(D.N.J. 2011) (applying the transformative test to Hart’s depiction in NCAA Football 2009). 
 135. See Order on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts’s Anti-SLAPP 
Motion to Strike, supra note 59, at 9. According to the court in Keller, when interpreting the 
facts in the light most favorable to Keller, Electronic Arts “does not depict [Keller] in a different 
form; he is represented as what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State University” 
because the avatar of Sam Keller “wears the same jersey number [as him], is the same height 
and weight and hails from the same state.” Id. at 10. 
 136. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 09-cv-5990 (FLW) (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2011), at *54. 
 137. Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Electronic Arts’s Anti-Slapp Motion to 
Strike, Keller v. Electronic Arts, C-09-1967, Feb. 8, 2010, at 48–49 (noting that as examples of 
“transformative elements,” the court pointed to “virtual stadiums, athletes, coaches, fans, sound 
effects, music and commentary, all of which are created and compiled by the games’ designers,” 
as well as features in the video game that permit users to alter player avatars, change player 
ability levels, and “change the team of which the player is a part by downloading varying team 
names and rosters”) (quoting, in part, Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 615). 
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test, that court also improperly applied the transformative element 
test.138 
2.  How Hart v. Electronic Arts Failed to Properly Apply the 
Transformative Element Test 
While Hart v. Electronic Arts provides the most extensive analysis 
of the transformative test as applied to college sports video games, the 
district court’s reasoning in Hart was specious in many respects, and 
thus the court’s decision should have come out in the opposite 
direction.139 Most troubling, the court in Hart failed to properly analyze 
the holdings of the transformative element cases that it cited.140 For 
instance, the court cited to the California case Comedy III Productions, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (Comedy III) for its formulation of the 
transformative element test, but then disregarded the language in 
Comedy III that explains how distortions to a celebrity’s figure are 
transformative only if they do not serve as “good substitutes for 
conventional depictions of the celebrity.”141 If the district court in Hart 
had properly applied the law of Comedy III, it would have concluded 
that Electronic Arts’s distortions to the avatars by allowing users to 
choose between different hairstyle options were not transformative.142 
Indeed, even after these distortions, the avatars still resemble the actual 
athletes.143 
In addition, the court in Hart seemed to err in presuming that a video 
game’s inclusion of “virtual stadiums, athletes, coaches, fans, sound 
effects, music, and commentary” makes the video game sufficiently 
transformative.144 This presumption fails to account for the language of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hilton v. Hallmark 
                                                                                                                     
 138. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 906-08 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing 
various public purpose tests utilized by California courts); see also Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 
778–80 (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001));  cf. id. at 
775 (explaining that the Hart court, although based within the Third Circuit, relied on 
“decisional law throughout the country” because “neither New Jersey nor the Third Circuit has 
explicitly adopted a test that reconciles First Amendment interests with the state law right of 
publicity”).  
 139. See infra notes 140–61 and accompanying text.  
 140. See infra notes 141–61 and accompanying text.  
 141. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001); see also 
Hilton, 599 F.3d at 910 (“[M]erely merchandising a celebrity’s image without that person’s 
consent, the prevention of which is the core of the right of publicity, does not amount to a 
transformative use.”). 
 142. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 785. 
 143. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 810–11 (noting further that for the transformative 
test to apply in California “an artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something more than a 
‘merely trivial’ variation, [but must create] something recognizably ‘his own’, in order to 
qualify for legal protection”).  
 144. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 784. 
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Cards, which explained that First Amendment protection applies only 
where “a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that 
it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the 
celebrity’s likeness.”145 Indeed, if simply adding a decorative 
background insulated video game publishers from any liability, then all 
video game publishers would opt to create new backgrounds rather than 
purchasing publicity rights from celebrities.146 
A third likely error in Hart was that the case relied on Kirby v. Sega 
of America, Inc. as support for the position that a decorative background 
makes the use of a celebrity’s likeness transformative.147 However, a 
careful reading of Kirby explains that the case was about far more than 
just a decorative background.148 In Kirby, the video game character 
Ulala was placed in an entirely fanciful time and place: outer space, 
several centuries into the future.149 By contrast, the college-athlete 
avatars in Electronic Arts’s NCAA Football video game appear as 
digital replicas of themselves, performing in actual college football 
stadiums.150 Clearly, the two are not the same.151 
Meanwhile, yet a fourth likely error in Hart involves the way that 
the court pointed to “[t]he malleability of the player’s image [to 
suggest] that the image serves as an art-imitating-life starting point for 
the game playing experience” and that “the technology that permits 
users to alter a player’s image is itself a noteworthy, expressive attribute 
of the game.”152 This interpretation is misguided because the 
malleability feature in NCAA Football gives users the ability to alter the 
attributes of avatars to more closely resemble those of actual players.153 
In addition, this feature gives users the ability to add college athletes’ 
actual names to the back of avatar jerseys.154 These are both clearly 
infringing uses.155 Typically, courts have held that when a technology 
either induces or encourages infringement, the publishers of the 
technology are liable for the resulting wrongdoing.156 Here, the 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 909. 
 146. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee by Screen Actors Guild, supra note 57, 
at 16; see also Transcript of Proceedings to Consolidate Various Litigations Against the NCAA 
at 12, Keller v. Elec. Arts, C-09-1967 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009) (Wilken, J.). 
 147. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 782, 787 (citing Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 607, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 148. See Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 610, 616. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 784. 
 151. Compare note 148  and accompanying text with note 150 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 
 153. See id. at 784–85 (noting that NCAA Football users are “able to change the image’s 
features, statistics, and teammates”). 
 154. See id. at 784.  
 155. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.  
 156. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 927–41 
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conclusion should be no different. Thus, the malleability function 
actually seems to support a finding that Electronic Arts breached 
college athletes’ rights of publicity.157 
Finally, a fifth potential error in Hart pertains to its reliance on the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court case Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n.158 Although the Supreme Court in Brown acknowledged that the 
content in video games represented a form of speech, Brown was not 
about balancing intellectual property rights against free speech in the 
context of a transformational analysis.159 Rather, Brown was simply 
about whether the State of California may impose a law implementing a 
content-based restriction on violent speech in video games.160 Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Brown was entirely inapposite.161 
C.  Electronic Arts’s Speech Creates a Disincentive for College Athletes 
to Innovate 
Moving beyond the public interest and transformative element 
inquiries, the third factor in balancing college athletes’ publicity rights 
                                                                                                                     
(2005) (finding that whoever distributes a device for the purpose of allowing for copyright 
infringement may be held liable for third parties’ subsequent copyright infringement, even if the 
device also serves non-infringing uses); see also Fantasy Sports Props.  Inc. v.  SportsLine.com, 
Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (leaving open the possibility that SportsLine.com  
was liable for patent infringement where its fantasy football game allowed users to select a 
scoring system that would violate Fantasy Sports Properties’ patents). 
 157. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 545 U.S. at 930 (explaining that a manufacturer of 
technology is liable for contributory infringement by “intentionally inducing or encouraging 
direct infringement” and liable for vicarious infringement “by profiting from direct infringement 
while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it”). 
 158. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 768–69, 771, 785 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)). 
 159. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n , 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732–33, 2735  (2011). 
 160. See id. at 2738 (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected 
speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, 
unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest . . . California cannot meet that standard.”); see also Terri R. Day &  Ryan C.W. Hall, 
Déjà Vu: From Comic Books to Video Games: Legislative Reliance on “Soft Science” to Protect 
Against Uncertain Societal Harm Linked to Violence v. the First Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 
415, 419 (2010) (referring to Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association as “a 
case involving statutory restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of violent 
video games to minors”); Deana Pollard Sacks, Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Do 
Violent Video Games Harm Children? Comparing the Scientific Amicus Curiae “Experts” in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (stating that the 
primary issue presented to the Supreme Court in Brown was “whether California’s interest in 
protecting children from serious psychological or neurological harm is sufficiently compelling 
to overcome First Amendment scrutiny”); Christopher S. Yoo, Technologies of Control and the 
Future of the First Amendment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 754 (2011) (referring to Brown as 
an example in which “the Court struck down a California statute requiring the labeling of 
violent video games and preventing their sale to minors”).  
 161. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
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against the First Amendment involves considering whether the use of 
college athletes’ likenesses in video games creates a disincentive to 
innovate.162 In applying this factor, recent courts have shown an 
increasing reluctance to protect professional athletes’ publicity rights 
when faced with a First Amendment defense because professional 
athletes “are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in 
games.”163  
At first glance, one may presume this same line of case law is 
relevant to collegiate athletes, who also enjoy great fame for playing 
their sport.164 However, a close inspection of the plight of the modern 
college athlete indicates that college athletes, especially in the sport of 
football, are more akin to apprentices or interns than to highly 
compensated professional athletes.165 Indeed, according to a recent 
report entitled The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sports, more 
than 85% of college athletes live below the federal poverty line.166 
Because protecting the publicity rights of college athletes redistributes 
wealth in a downward direction, this final factor strongly points in favor 
of protecting college athletes’ publicity rights as a means to encourage 
their continued performance and innovation as athletes.167 
V.  REDEFINING THE BALANCING TEST BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Any careful review of case law involving the right of publicity, Hart 
notwithstanding, should lead to the conclusion that college athletes are 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text; see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. Inc. 
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Other motives 
for creating a publicity right are the desire to provide incentives to encourage a person’s 
productive activities.”); see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY 
§ 2.2 (1987) (explaining that publicity rights are intended to protect the financial incentive for 
celebrities to engage in beneficial activities that are within the public’s eye). 
 163. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 824; see also Edelman, supra note 47, at 43–44 
(discussing more generally the balance of the right of publicity against the First Amendment in 
fantasy sports games). 
 164. See Bagnato, supra note 12 (discussing how college athletes are well-recognized and 
admired as celebrities throughout their community). 
 165. See infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text; cf. Rohith A. Parasuraman, Note, 
Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 743, n.85  (2007) 
(“With respect to time commitment, college athletes fall somewhere between medical interns 
and graduate assistants.”). 
 166. See Troy Hirsch, Report: 85 Percent of College Scholarship Athletes Live in Poverty, 
FOX 5 SPORTS, Sept. 21, 2011, available at http://www.fox5sandiego.com/sports/kswb-report-
85-of-college-scholarship-athletes-live-in-poverty-20110921,0,2116195.story. 
 167. See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text; see also Michael Madow, Private 
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 136–
37 (1993) (the author, a general opponent of the right of publicity, notes that his typical 
complaint against protecting such rights is that it often redistributes wealth upwards). 
29
Edelman: Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for Protecting Colle
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
582 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
entitled to compensation for the use of their names and likenesses in 
commercial video games such as NCAA Football.168 Nevertheless, even 
if the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ultimately reverses 
Hart, doing so would still not likely provide adequate protection for 
today’s college athletes against future infringement of their publicity 
rights.169 This is because even under a proper interpretation of the 
“balancing test,” video game publishers could continue to avoid liability 
by simply making a partial, albeit incomplete, modification to their 
avatars.170 
Perhaps recognizing that a partial, albeit incomplete, modification to 
an avatar is likely sufficient to avoid liability in most courts, Electronic 
Arts recently decided to preemptively modify the avatars of a few 
premier college football players that appear in its 2012 edition of NCAA 
Football.171 Most notably, Electronic Arts recently removed the 
dreadlock hairdo from the avatar that represents the University of 
Michigan’s starting quarterback, even though dreadlocks have become a 
signature of the University of Michigan’s real-life starting quarterback, 
Denard Robinson.172 In addition, Electronic Arts has added a blocking 
feature to its 2012 edition of NCAA Football that prevents users from 
modifying the hairdo of the University of Michigan quarterback avatar 
to dreadlocks.173 
The reason for Electronic Arts’s limited modifications to certain 
avatars in NCAA Football 12 seems less about protecting college 
athletes’ rights and more about making the absolute minimum number 
of modifications required to avoid potential liability, even if Hart were 
to be reversed.174 For instance, even though the avatar in the 2012 
edition of NCAA Football no longer bears Denard Robinson’s signature 
dreadlocks, the avatar still maintains numerous other characteristics of 
Denard Robinson, including his skill set, number, skin tone, height, and 
weight.175 Thus, most users would continue to easily recognize it as an 
avatar based on Denard Robinson.176  
                                                                                                                     
 168. See supra Parts II, III, IV. 
 169. See infra notes 170–85 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 613, 617–18 (Cal. 2006) 
(noting a California court’s view that, when creating an avatar out of a human identity, 
modifying one’s likeness in “significant respects” is enough to avoid liability under the common 
law right of publicity). 
 171. See Operation Sports Forums, Impossible to Give Denard Robinson Dreads?, 
OPERATION SPORTS, July 13, 2011, http://www.operationsports.com/forums/ncaa-football-
rosters/493410-impossible-give-denard-robinson-dreads.html. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (calling into doubt 
whether minor modifications to a likeness should negate right of publicity violations). 
 175. See Yuille, supra note 77 and explanatory parenthetical; Denard Robinson Injured 
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In light of such self-serving attempts by video game publishers to 
use the First Amendment as a shield, courts should change their view of 
the existing balancing test to recognize that even a partial, albeit 
incomplete, transformation of a celebrity’s likeness would not entirely 
absolve liability under a proper right of publicity balancing test.177 
Rather, in such contexts, courts should treat the partially transformative 
element as simply a mitigating factor to liability, and then assign 
damages based on the proportionate share of the celebrity’s original 
likeness still in the final avatar.178 
This slightly revised version of a transformative element inquiry 
within the greater scope of a First Amendment balancing test could 
continue to place the initial burden on a plaintiff to show a prima facie 
case of breach of his publicity rights.179 In addition, once this burden is 
met, the burden could still shift to the defendant to argue in favor of 
First Amendment preemption.180 However, under a revised test, the 
inquiry’s third stage would change, requiring the burden to shift back to 
the plaintiff to argue that the transformative element represents a partial, 
rather than full, transformation of the plaintiff’s identity.181 If a court 
agrees that the transformation is merely partial, the plaintiff would still 
be entitled to damages, measurable based on the proportionate share of 
the defendant’s likeness that remains in the virtual player.182 
                                                                                                                     
Every Game, supra note 77 and explanatory parenthetical.  
 176. See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374 (noting that a weakness with the traditional 
application of the transformative element tests is that “[t]hough these tests purport to balance the 
prospective interests involved, there is no balancing at all—once the use is determined to be 
expressive, it is protected,” and “[i]f a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate the right of 
publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment”). 
 177. In other words, courts should treat the partial transformation of one’s likeness as a 
factor toward mitigating damages; whereas courts treat the public interest defense as a bar on 
recovering any damages. 
 178. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text (discussing how a similar concept 
today is used in torts with respect to the doctrine of contributory negligence); see also infra 
notes 183-85  and accompanying text (explaining how this concept coincides with the property 
law doctrine of shared property rights). 
 179. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(placing prima facie burden on plaintiff to show breach of one’s right of publicity before turning 
to the broader balancing test and consideration of image transformation); see also C.B.C. 
Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 822–23 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (same). 
 180. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 824 (ultimately holding, upon burden 
shifting, that “CBC’s first amendment rights in offering its fantasy baseball products supersede 
the players’ rights of publicity”). 
 181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 182. See generally Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003) (“[I]n a right 
of publicity action, ‘the measure of damages focuses on the pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or the 
unjust pecuniary gain to the defendant.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
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Treating the use of a partial transformative element as a means of 
mitigating damages rather than as a complete bar to recovery coincides 
with the U.S. legal system’s broad movement toward apportioning 
liability rather than treating it as absolute.183 In addition, this approach 
is consistent with modern property theory, which recognizes that 
“where more than one party has a valid claim to a single piece of 
property, the court will recognize an undivided interest in the property 
in proportion to the strength of the claim.”184 Finally, it should be noted 
that this approach comports with the important principles of economic 
efficiency and fairness by exposing even a partial free rider to liability 
and disgorging the free rider’s unjust enrichment.185  
CONCLUSION 
Several right of publicity cases, including most recently the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey’s decision in Hart v. 
Electronic Arts, reinforce the peculiar fate of college athletes as 
individuals who generate great economic value for society but are 
nevertheless prohibited from controlling the commercial use of their 
own names and likenesses.186 Such a result—that a multi-billion dollar 
video game publisher, without a license, may insert the likenesses of 
college athletes into its video games—undermines the very foundation 
                                                                                                                     
COMPETITION, sec. 49, cmt. b). 
 183. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 465–67 
(1953); see also Stuart F. Schaffer, Comment, Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special 
Verdict Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 824, 825 (1981) (“The 
doctrine of comparative negligence has gained increasing popularity . . . as a means of 
mitigating the harshness of the common law contributory negligence defense. A system of 
contributory negligence completely bars a plaintiff from recovery against a negligent defendant 
if the plaintiff’s negligence is a proximate cause of his damages. A system of comparative 
negligence apportions the relative negligence of the parties and reduces the plaintiff’s recovery 
according to his degree of fault. Although the defense of contributory negligence remains under 
the comparative negligence system, the plaintiff’s negligence reduces, rather than bars, his 
award of damages. The comparative negligence system is fairer than the system based on the 
all-or-nothing contributory negligence defense because under the former a negligent plaintiff 
may recover for damages proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731 at *8 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) 
(ultimately finding that both a baseball spectator who initially undertook significant steps to 
achieve possession of a home run baseball and a spectator who ultimately recovered baseball 
had property right interests in the baseball). 
 185. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (3d. ed. 1986) 
(explaining that the law “may be viewed as an effort to attach costs to the violation of moral 
principles—principles that . . . operate to enhance the efficiency of a market economy”). 
 186. See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 793–94 (D.N.J. 2011) 
(declining college football players’ control over the use of their likenesses in a college football 
video game); O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (same, with 
respect to a photograph used in conjunction with a college football schedule and beer 
advertisement). 
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of the right of publicity as an intellectual property right meant to protect 
the commercial interests of celebrities to control their own likenesses.187 
While those who defend unbridled protection of the First 
Amendment may praise Hart as an important victory for video game 
publishers’ freedom of speech, the Hart decision actually does far more 
to destroy college athletes’ rights of publicity than to safeguard free 
speech.188 Indeed, unlike most traditional First Amendment cases, the 
“speech” at issue in Hart was not traditional public interest speech, but 
rather speech targeted almost exclusively at obtaining a commercial 
advantage over other sports video game publishers.189 In addition, the 
proceeds that Electronic Arts derived from using college athletes’ 
likenesses without a license became windfall profits for Electronic Arts, 
as did the additional proceeds obtained by the NCAA when negotiating 
the license of its intellectual property rights to Electronic Arts.190  
Fully eliminating the NCAA rules that prohibit a free labor market 
for college athletes would require courts to engage in complicated 
debates about colleges’ educational mission and requirements to comply 
with Title IX.191 These types of debates extend beyond the traditional 
scope of the court system. By contrast, allowing college athletes to sell 
their names and likenesses to video game publishers, much as 
professional athletes have now done for decades, is comparatively 
                                                                                                                     
 187. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
 188. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 51 (6th ed. 2006); see also Uhlaender v. 
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (“Perhaps the basic and underlying 
theory is that a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his own industry free from unjustified 
interference.”); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Mo. 1911) (noting that “[i]f there is 
value in [one’s likeness], sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the property of 
him who gives it the value and from whom  the value springs?”). 
 189. See supra notes 109–66 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Edelman, supra note 17, at 862 (“[B]y not paying student-athletes, the Principle of 
Amateurism leads to windfall profits for college coaches and administrators, who receive 
disproportionately high salaries and additional endorsement/promotion opportunities.”); see also 
Sarah M. Konsky, Note, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1581, 1585 (2003) (“[T]he NCAA maximizes profits beyond a competitive rate and keeps the 
windfall in the hands of select few administrators, athletic directors, and coaches.”); cf. 
Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 357 (noting several commentators’ belief that the “economic impact 
of the NCAA’s amateurism rules creates a wealth transfer from the players to their schools”); 
Bagnato, supra note 12 (quoting Duke Sports Law Professor John Weistart as accusing the 
NCAA of “trying to hold back a real economic force” in college athletes). 
 191. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 367 (noting that unless Title IX is changed, there 
would be “exorbitant” costs involved with deregulating college athletic labor markets); 
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 13, at 79–80 n.34 (recognizing complicated issues 
related to recognizing student-athletes as employees that emerge from Title IX and extend 
beyond the scope of their article); cf. Title IX, 20 U.S.C §§ 1682–88 (2006) (providing full 
statutory language of Title IX); Paul Anderson & Barbara Osborne, A Historical Review of Title 
IX Litigation, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 127, 128 (2008) (discussing the practical history of 
Title IX litigation against colleges and their athletic departments). 
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simple.192 College athletes could even sell their names and likenesses to 
publishers without violating the NCAA Principle of Amateurism if they 
require publishers to make payment into a trust fund on their behalf.193  
Most agree that college athletes provide “the most essential 
ingredient of any NCAA sports product.”194 However, for far too long, 
courts have used technicalities to deny college athletes the fruits of their 
labor.195 This result was especially evident in the case of Hart v. 
Electronic Arts, in which the First Amendment defense was used as just 
another legal fiction to allow both Electronic Arts and the NCAA to 
continue to exploit college athletes’ work product.196 
To protect the future interests of college athletes, courts must 
recognize that the scales of justice point in favor of protecting college 
athletes’ publicity rights in commercial video games.197 Furthermore, 
courts must modify how they interpret right of publicity laws to ensure 
that video game publishers cannot use the mere partial transformation of 
college athletes’ avatars as a loophole to avoid providing college 
athletes with their fair share of video game profits.198 
  
 
                                                                                                                     
 192. See Edelman, supra note 17, at 887–88 (noting that, unlike full deregulation of NCAA 
labor markets, allowing college athletes to control their publicity rights “does not involve any 
payment from educational institutions to student-athletes, and therefore is free from the 
regulation’s scope”). 
 193. See Cohen, supra note 107 (noting that sports business author Marc Isenberg believes 
that there is a way without violating NCAA bylaws to “create a trust fund for athletes, funded by 
revenue from TV rights payments”). 
 194. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 354.  
 195. See, e.g., Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 
1992) (denying a college football player the right to challenge an NCAA rule under antitrust law 
based on the court’s conclusion that the NCAA member schools are not “‘purchasers of labor’” 
in the traditional sense); O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding 
that a college football player could not make a claim for breach of his right of privacy for the 
use of his picture in a beer advertisement where the beer manufacturer had purchased rights to 
the picture directly from the athlete’s college).  
 196. See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 794 (D.N.J. 2011) (holding 
that Electronic Arts “is entitled to assert the First Amendment defense and its motion for 
summary judgment must, therefore, be granted”). 
 197. See supra notes 71–167 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Id. 
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